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ABSTRACT
This study develops an intertemporally linked market model to explore the relationships
between price-cost margins, market concentration, and advertising outlay. The study used
data from 48 four-digit SIC (standardized industrial classiﬁcation) codes for the Food and
Tobacco Processing Industries during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The authors’ ﬁndings
provide evidence that both high and low levels of performance provide signals to industries to
consolidate, but for obvious and different reasons. Further, increased consolidation leads to
increased entry barriers (advertising) and higher proﬁts to the industry. Our ﬁndings are
supportive of both Chicago and Traditionalist Schools of thought about antitrust
enforcement: Neither emerges in a dominant position. Endogeneity issues and ﬁndings within
the intertemporal structure cast considerable doubt about overly simplistic structure–performance paradigms of ﬁrm behavior. [JEL Code: L11, L40, L66]. r 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

1. INTRODUCTION
Over 60 years ago, the paradigm known as Structure–Conduct–Performance (SCP)
was forwarded by Bain (1951) as a formal model to explain the behavior of ﬁrms in
an industry. Associated with the Harvard Tradition, this new approach came to
replace the old case-study approach. The primary distinction of SCP from case
studies was in the way researchers looked at data. The SCP approach relied on crosssections of industry data, insisting that industries are shaped by some basic
conditions: demand elasticities, product durability, and technology, which determine
the market structure: number and size of ﬁrms, entry conditions, product
differentiation, and vertical integration, which lead to conduct: pricing, advertising
and R&D strategies, which, in turn, determine market performance: efﬁciency,
equity, and technological change.
High rank correlations across industries in different developed countries suggested
that tastes and technology, which are likely to be constant across regions, determine
the equilibrium structure. Researchers in the 1950s through the 1970s produced
numerous marquee articles that regressed price-cost margins (PCMs) with variables
such as industry concentration, minimum efﬁcient scale (MES), capital intensity,
R&D, and quadratic- (inverted U-) shaped effects from advertising to sales ratios
(see Collins & Preston, 1969 and Kwoka, 1979 for excellent reviews of the literature

and relevant ﬁndings). Market concentration was generally found positively related
to higher PCMs, which conﬁrmed the emerging conventional wisdom portended by
Bain. Support for the inverted U-shaped role of advertising was also found, which
suggested waning competition from new entry and even for incumbent market share
once an industry was sufﬁciently concentrated. Armed with convincing evidence of
concerns about concentration, U.S. antitrust authorities took an aggressive stance
during the 1960s and 1970s on mergers, predatory pricing, and resale price
maintenance, while ushering in premerger notiﬁcation laws and stepped up
information reporting.
According to Reder (1982), the opposing Chicago School view, which emerged in
the 1970s, laid its initial foundations shortly after World War II. Reder points to the
arguments of Pareto efﬁciency, articulate lay communications by Chicago scholars,
and the vacuum of free-market thought in the wake of the U.S. depression as major
contributing forces that gave the Chicago School momentum for its rise. The
Chicago technical critique of the SCP approach is derived from its efﬁciency
undergirdings and lies primarily in the SCP treatment of concentration as a purely
exogenous variable. When this does not hold, the error term in the SCP regression is
correlated with concentration and the ordinary least squares (OLS) properties of the
model are lost (biased parameters, asymptotically biased parameters, efﬁciency,
asymptotic efﬁciency, consistency). Indeed, it could be that industry structure, prices,
and proﬁts are simultaneously determined. The Chicago School provided a related
critique. If several ﬁrms in an industry are very efﬁcient, they may earn large rents on
their efﬁciency and also grow their market shares. Industries with a few such efﬁcient
ﬁrms will be concentrated and this concentration is derived not by high prices but
low average costs for some ﬁrms. Demsetz (1973, 1974) and others estimated
versions of the following equation using ﬁrm-level data:
Pif ¼ b0 þ b1 Ci þ b2 sif þ bZ þ eif ;

ð1Þ

where P is the performance (proﬁt or PCM) of ﬁrm f in industry i, C is
concentration, s is market share, and Z is a vector of other relevant exogenous
variables. Although they usually found that the parameter on concentration was
almost never signiﬁcant and positive, the coefﬁcient on market share was signiﬁcant,
which lent considerable support to the Chicago critique. Antitrust authorities in the
1980s and 1990s shifted attention toward the economic beneﬁts of lower costs (i.e.,
efﬁciency) and looked harder for ways in which concentrated industries could be
forced to price competitively. Theories arriving from a plethora of game theory
contexts broadened our understanding of the ﬁrm behavior and the new empirical
industrial organization emerged to provide a framework for the testing of structural
based market power for speciﬁc industries.
In this article, we conducted research on the premise that both the Traditionalist
School (TS) and Chicago School (CS) have redeeming merits. Our methods ﬂow
from work by Kambhampati (1996, pp. 133–148) and also from Delorme, Klein,
Kamerschen, and Voeks (2002) [hereafter DKKV]. Both studies use a system of
simultaneous equations similar to Strickland and Weiss (1976) and extend beyond
Martin’s (1979) early use of intertemporal relations between structure, conduct and
performance. Even after Martin’s pathbreaking work, numerous TS studies
bypassed the known intertemporal relationships with simple contemporaneous
systems, for examples, Gupta (1983), Schmalensee (1989), and Weiss (1991).

Many of the basic ideas founded by the TS are not in conﬂict with CS. For
example, both schools of thought have long recognized that basic market
characteristics such as minimum efﬁcient scale help to determine market structure.
The key difference, as alluded to above, is that CS thought hinges more closely on
the role that ﬁrm level performance may have on structure while the TS focus is
on the role that structure has on performance. The history of TS thought before
Martin (1979) was principally that performance had no feedback role on changing
the structure. In our setup, we are able to evaluate the simultaneous role that
industry performance has on structure and vice versa.
The research was conducted on the 48 Food and Kindred Product and Tobacco
(FKPT) industries deﬁned by the U.S. Census Bureau’s 4-digit SIC (standard
industrial classiﬁcation) codes during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Average market
concentration in the FKPT industries increased signiﬁcantly over the past 50 years.
As a result, about 40% of the FKPT industries are commonly considered to be
highly concentrated, as deﬁned by four ﬁrms controlling 60% or more of sales
(Mueller & Rogers, 1980, 1984; Rogers & Tokle, 1995). To date, a number of studies
have examined market structure–performance relationships in the FKPT industries
(see Rogers, 2001, and citations therein). These studies have used various measures
of proﬁts and/or industry PCMs to measure proﬁt performance, and most were
conducted using data for years before 1980. Critically, these studies are purely in the
TS format: Performance is restricted from having a role in determining structure. In
the present article, we investigated the simultaneous, intertemporally linked
relationships among performance (PCMs), structure (market concentration), and
conduct (advertising outlays). To date, no cross-sectional study of the U.S. FKPT
industries have considered the potential for intertemporal relations in a simultaneously determined system.
Kambhampati (1996) and DKKV assert that each variable in the SCP model
inﬂuences the other variables in a time-dependent manner. Kambhampati (1996)
argues that (a) structure is affected by lagged conduct and both lagged and current
performance, (b) past conduct represents a potential barrier to entry, (c) improving
past and current performance leads to more concentrated structures, (d) previous
year’s performance inﬂuences the current conduct, and (e) performance determinants
remain contemporaneous as the proﬁts are computed in the current period. In this
study, we explore the intertemporal interrelations suggested by Kambhampati (1996)
and DKKV. Although our modeling framework follows closely to that of DKKV, at
least four major differences are noteworthy:
1. Study focus: The present study focuses on partitioning the FKPT industries into
low and high advertising categories. DKKV considered a broader set of industries
and they used ﬁrm data available in the Compustat database (Standard & Poor’s,
McGraw-Hill, New York, NY). The problem with using Compustat data lies in
that potential biases might arise when considering only publicly traded ﬁrms.
2. Lagged terms: Our data set spans ﬁve census years (1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and
1992) and lagged variables are contained in the census years.1 The DKKV study
used data in 1982, 1987, and 1992, but adopted lagged variables from just the
previous year.
1

See section 5 for discussions on issues of more recent data.

3. Concentration on advertising: Following Greer (1971), Cable (1972), and
Strickland and Weiss (1976), we examine whether the effect of concentration
on advertising takes an inverted-U shape. DKKV restricted their model to
consider only a linear relationship.
4. Minimum efﬁcient scale (MES): We incorporate MES to model the effect of scale
of economies in the analysis (Connor et al., 1985; Sutton, 1991). The DKKV
study lacked the data to include MES in the analysis.
To evaluate the relationship among PCMs, market concentration, and advertising
properly, a simultaneous-equation model is needed to obtain consistent and
unbiased estimates. For this study, we estimated the simultaneous-equation system
using two-stage least squares (2SLS). The rest of this article is organized as follows.
The simultaneous-equation framework is presented and discussed in
Section 2. The empirical setup and data used in this study are discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 contains the result from three regressions. Finally, Section 5
provides concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.
2. THE MODEL
Following Kambhampati (1996) and DKKV, the intertemporal system of equations
presumes three endogenous variables: industry concentration (CR4), advertising
(AD), and industry price-cost margins (PCM). Each of the system’s equations are
developed and discussed below.
Beginning ﬁrst with industry structure, we are interested in evaluating the role of
current and past performance and potential barriers to entry in shaping the industry
level concentration. The equation is written:
CR4t ¼ a0 þ a1 ADt1 þ a2 KOt1 þ a3 PCMt1 þ a4 PCMt þ a5 MESt1
þ a6 MESt þ Z1t ;

ð2Þ

where CR4 is the four-ﬁrm concentration ratio, AD is advertising intensity calculated
by the ratio of advertising expenditure to value of shipments, KO (capital-output
ratio) is gross ﬁxed assets relative to value of shipments, PCM is the price-cost
margin, and MES is the minimum efﬁcient scale. The subscripts t and t1 represent
current and lagged one period, respectively. All of the coefﬁcients are expected to be
positive.
An important determinant of concentration may indeed be the MES deﬁned as
smallest optimum ﬁrm size divided by a measure of market size. Three different
approaches are used for estimating the MES numerator: (a) economic-engineering
studies, (b) midpoint plant size as a proxy, and (c) plant size with the lowest labor
costs as a proxy. Using 13 four-digit SIC industries in the U.S. food and drink sector,
Connor et al. (1985) report that median plant estimates based on the 1972 Census of
Manufactures and engineering estimates over 1970–1980 are highly correlated
(r 5 0.83; pp. 93–95). Therefore, we used the size of the industry’s median plant
divided by industry sales to be a proxy of MES. The median plant size is deﬁned as
the size of the plant that is at the midpoint of the industry shipments size distribution
(Connor et al., 1985; Strickland & Weiss, 1976). Because MES represents the set-up
costs of installing a new plant, the impacts are likely to take time to impact industry
concentration; thus, we expect a5Za6.

Additional barriers to entry can be observed when ﬁrms gain signiﬁcant
brand image from advertising or when ﬁrms operate in industries with high
ﬁxed costs. Therefore, lagged advertising and lagged capital investment are
included in the model, and the associated coefﬁcients are expected to be positive.
The ﬁnal two determinants of concentration include current and lagged PCMs.
Inclusion of PCMs is suggestive of the meritorious incentives that proﬁts might
create in encouraging successful ﬁrms to grow and ineffective ones to shrink
and/or exit.
The advertising intensity equation (second in our system) is given by:
ADt ¼ b0 þ b1 PCMt1 þ b2 GRt þ b3 CR4t þ b4 CR42t þ Z2t ;

ð3Þ

where GR is the growth in industrial production calculated as the ratio of
current year shipments to those in the previous period. Inclusion of the lagged
PCM variable follows from Sutton’s two-stage approach (1991, pp. 27–81),
Kambhampati (1996), and DKKV. Previous year’s proﬁts are expected to have
impacts on current advertising expenditure; i.e., the more past proﬁts, the more
current advertising outlays. In Greer (1971), Cable (1972), Comanor and Wilson
(1974), and DKKV, the growth of sales is incorporated to control for successful
new product development, positive demand shocks and/or greater levels of
advertising induced product differentiation. The coefﬁcients b1 and b2, are expected
to be positive.
As investigated in Greer (1971), Cable (1972), and Strickland and Weiss (1976),
the effect of concentration on advertising takes an inverted U shape. Advertising
is expected to be increasing in concentration when concentration ratio is
low (Dorfman & Steiner, 1954), but decreasing at very high levels of
concentration when it becomes easier for ﬁrms to collude to avoid mutually
offsetting advertising. Therefore, in the advertising equation we add a quadratic term
(CR42) to capture this type of nonlinear relationship. An inverted U-shaped
relationship requires that the coefﬁcient on CR4 be positive and that of CR42 to be
negative.
The equation for PCMs is essentially a performance measure that proxies industry
proﬁts. Many empirical studies explain PCMs with variables for concentration,
advertising, and other cost related variables (see, for example, Collins & Preston,
1966, 1969; Kwoka, 1979; Liebowitz, 1982; Ornstein, 1975; Rhoades & Cleaver,
1973; Weiss, 1991). The quality of Census PCMs as a proxy for proﬁts depends on
whether appropriate adjustments can be made to reﬂect critical elements of cost not
included in the Census PCMs of particular industries. In the food manufacturing
industries, the two most important costs associated with Census-derived PCMs are
the cost of advertising and promotion and the cost of capital. We address these
concerns by adding advertising intensity AD and capital intensity KO to the
equation. Although AD serves as a proxy for the production differentiation barrier,
MES represents the scale barrier. In addition, unanticipated increases in demand or
unanticipated decrease in costs might result in high margins. Output growth GR is
incorporated to reﬂect the effects.
The census concentration ratios do not characterize market concentration
correctly where markets are local or regional in nature because the ratios generally
refer to national industries. Following Rogers (2001), we add a dummy (NL) for a
local or regional industry, for example, milk or bread, to correct possible biases.

Therefore, the PCM equation is given by
PCMt ¼ g0 þ g1 GRt þ g2 KOt þ g3 CR4t þ g4 ADt þ g5 MESt þ g6 NL þ Z3t : ð4Þ
As a ﬁnal note, to account for other possible unobservable factors such as
aggregate demand shifts or technological change, we included a time trend variable
in each equation.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE DATA
We used two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the proposed simultaneousequation system. In the ﬁrst stage, each endogenous variable (concentration,
advertising, and price-cost margin) is regressed on all exogenous variables, including
MES, lagged MES, capital-output ratio (KO), lagged KO, lagged AD, lagged PCM,
lagged GR, nonnational market dummy, and time trend. In the second stage, the
ﬁtted values of endogenous variables from the ﬁrst stage are used as instruments to
estimate the three structural equations. Throughout this article, the critical level for
determining strong statistical signiﬁcance in a two-tailed test was established at the
5% level. We signiﬁed moderate statistical support with the signiﬁcance level at 10%.
Except for advertising intensity and the local/regional dummy variables, all of the
variables used to estimate Equations 2–4 are derived from the 1972, 1977, 1982,
1987, and 1992 Census of Manufactures. The Census variables are for 48 four-digit
SIC FKPT Industries for each Census year. Thus, the data set contains 240
observations. Table 1 shows 48 four-digit SIC industries examined in this study. The
four-ﬁrm concentration ratios for three selected census years (1972, 1982, and 1992)
are also presented. Though the concentration ratio may increase or decrease for each
individual industry across different Census years, the average CR4 increased from
44.10% in 1972 to 46.21% in 1982, and ﬁnally to 53.90% in 1992. Simple
calculations of CR4 changes show the average concentration ratios increase
moderately over these periods. We will discuss more details on the trend of CR4
in the estimation of simultaneous-equation system below.
The media advertising data are from Competitive Media Reporting (CMR; Taylor
Nelson Sofres plc, London, UK). We match advertising data to corresponding
industries to create advertising-to-sales ratios in each Census year. The local/regional
dummy is assigned on the basis of judgment, including industries of ice cream and ice
(2024), ﬂuid milk (2026), prepared feeds (2048), bread, cake, & related products
(2051), bottled and canned soft drinks (2086), and manufactured ice (2097).
To explore the differences between high and low advertising intensive industries,
we segmented the full sample (240 observations) into two groups by using
advertising-to-sales (A/S) ratio and conducted the above-mentioned analysis on
each subgroup. Group 1 was high advertising industries, in which their A/S ratios
were greater than 0.25% for all Census years. Group 1 included 140 observations.
The rest of the observations were classiﬁed as low advertising.2 Table 2 gives the
means for key variables based on full sample and both groups. The mean CR4 is
quite a bit higher in the high advertising group compared to the low advertising
group. This is consistent with Sutton’s (1991) theory that advertising is a viable
2
Our examination on the robustness showed that there is no change in the subsamples used for high and
low advertisers as long as the critical level of A/S ratio is less than 0.35%.

TABLE 1.

Concentration in Food and Tobacco Processing Industries, 1972–1992
CR4

SIC

Name

2011
2013
2021
2022
2023
2024
2026
2032
2033
2034
2035
2037
2038
2041
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2051
2052
2061
2062
2063
2066
2067
2074
2075
2076
2077
2079
2082
2083
2084
2085
2086
2087
2091
2092
2095
2097
2098
2099
2111
2121

Meat packing plant products
Sausages & prepared meats
Butter
Cheese, natural and processed
Condensed and evaporated milk
Ice cream and ices
Fluid milk
Canned specialties
Canned fruits and vegetables
Dehydrated fruits, vegetables, soups
Pickles, sauces, salad dressings
Frozen fruits and vegetables
Frozen specialties
Flour & other grain mill products
Cereal breakfast foods
Milled rice and byproducts
Prep. ﬂour mixes & refrigerated doughs
Wet corn milling
Dog, cat, and other pet food
Prepared feeds, n.e.c.
Bread, cake, & related products
Cookies and crackers
Sugar cane mill products
Reﬁned cane sugar
Reﬁned beet sugar
Chocolate and cocoa products
Chewing guma
Cottonseed oil mill products
Soybean oil mill products
Vegetable oil mill products, n.e.c.
Animal and marine fats and oils
Shortening and cooking oils
Malt beverages
Malt and malt byproducts
Wines, brandy, and brandy spirits
Distilled liquor, except brandy
Bottled and canned soft drinks
Flavoring extracts & syrups n.e.c.
Canned & cured seafood inc soup
Fresh or frozen packaged ﬁsh
Roasted coffee
Manufactured ice
Macaroni and spaghetti
Food preparations, n.e.c.
Cigarettes
Cigars

1972

1982

1992

Change
1972–82

Change
1982–92

26
16
37
40
34
27
17
62
18
31
30
28
36
32
84
42
62
63
50
22
27
58
43
58
66
72
84
42
52
45
17
40
52
49
52
50
14
62
38
21
64
29
34
26
84
55

27
15
29
35
33
22
15
59
20
41
40
28
31
40
86
44
62
73
50
19
32
59
41
65
67
69
87
50
56
49
24
40
78
61
52
46
15
61
44
13
66
17
37
29
90
58

50
25
49
42
43
24
22
69
27
39
41
28
40
56
85
50
39
73
58
23
34
56
52
85
71
75
96
62
71
89
37
35
90
65
54
62
37
69
29
19
66
24
78
22
93
74

1
1
8
5
1
5
2
3
2
10
10
0
5
8
2
2
0
10
0
3
5
1
2
7
1
3
3
8
4
4
7
0
26
12
0
4
1
1
6
8
2
12
3
3
6
3

23
10
20
7
10
2
7
10
7
2
1
0
9
16
1
6
23
0
8
4
2
3
11
20
4
6
9
12
15
40
13
5
12
4
2
16
22
8
15
6
0
7
41
7
3
16

TABLE 1. Continued
CR4
SIC
2131
2141

Name
Chewing, smoking tobacco, snuff
Tobacco stemming and redrying
means for SIC 20-21

1972

1982

1992

Change
1972–82

Change
1982–92

60
66
44.10

75
68
46.21

87
72
53.90

15
2
2.10

12
4
7.69

Note: The data source was the Census of Manufactures. CR4 5 industry concentration; SIC 5 standard
industrial classiﬁcation; n.e.c. 5 not elsewhere classiﬁed.
a
The 1992 CR4 for SIC 2067 is estimated by the authors.

TABLE 2.

Means for Selected Variables in Food and Tobacco Industries, 1972–1992

Variable
Sample size
CR4 (%)
A/S (%)
PCM (%)
Value of shipments ($B)b
MES (%)
KO (%)

Full
sample

Group 1:
High advertisinga

Group 2:
Low advertising

240
48.00
(21.14)
1.94
(2.84)
33.09
(14.45)
7.89
(1.19)
3.82
(4.88)
31.63
(20.42)

140
52.27
(20.72)
3.19
(3.16)
40.81
(12.14)
8.01
(1.06)
4.34
(5.57)
27.93
(9.83)

100
42.03
(20.36)
0.19
(0.30)
22.28
(9.29)
7.73
(1.34)
3.09
(3.61)
36.81
(28.71)

Note: CR4 5 industry concentration; A/S 5 advertising-to-sales ratio; PCM 5 price-cost margin; $B 5 billions of dollars; MES 5 minimum efﬁcient scale; KO 5 capital-output ratio.
a
A/S ratios were greater than 0.25% for all (5) census years. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
b
All corresponding group means are different at the 5% level except those of Value of shipments.

barrier to entry. Simple t-ratios indicate that CR4, PCM, MES, and KO have
statistically different means in the two samples. The mean PCM in the high
advertising group is almost twice the mean from the low advertising group.
4. RESULTS
Three pretests revealed important ﬁndings and led to modiﬁcations in the estimation
procedures for the system deﬁned in Equations 2 to 4. Autocorrelation was detected
using a modiﬁed Durbin-Watson test useful for panel data (Bhargava, Franzini, &
Narendranathan, 1982). The Breusch-Pagan test detected cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. Following the procedures in Beck and Katz (1995), we ﬁrst correct for
autocorrelation assuming a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process for each industry and
then adjust the error terms for cross-section heteroscedasticity to attain panel
corrected standard errors (PCSE). The heteroscedasticity adjustments are similar to

White’s robust standard errors, but consider the time-series cross-sectional
arrangement of the data as well. For the third pretest, pairwise correlation analysis
revealed that PCM and lagged PCM were highly collinear. Thus, it seems that
almost all of the variability in proﬁtability occurred cross-sectionally. Initial
estimates of the base model indicated this collinearity may not allow for a fair
hypothesis test critical to this analysis: that increased lagged and/or current
proﬁtability lead to higher levels of concentration. Dropping one of the variables in
this case represents a viable option, but theory cannot say which one should remain.
Though not reported in a table, the coefﬁcients on both variables yield the same
statistical results and nearly the same parameter values when the opposing variable is
dropped. Given the agnostic stance of either variable to the overall model result, we
chose to use PCM, obtained from (PCMt þ PCMt1 )/2, in the CR4 equation for all
the models estimated.
4.1. Base Model
Table 3 contains the estimation results using the entire dataset. For concentration
(Equation 2), we found that lagged advertising is responsible for increasing industry
concentration, supporting the widely held TS belief that ﬁrms will build entry
barriers when they can. Although the PCM variable was not signiﬁcant, very
interesting ﬁndings emerge about this variable in the subsequent regressions that use
partitioned data. We found that increases in lagged MES and current MES were
statistically signiﬁcant and positive. These ﬁndings support the TS views that
structure is inﬂuenced by technical scale economies in the production process. The
time trend in the CR4 equation is positive and signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is consistent
TABLE 3.

Two-stage Least Squares Estimates of Simultaneous Equations With PCSE

AD

CR4
Dependent
variable
Constant
CR4
CR42
AD1
AD
PCM1
PCM
MES1
MES
KO1
KO
GR
NL
Year

PCM

Estimate

t-value

Estimate

t-value

Estimate

t-value

24.7792

6.1930

0.1139
1.9605
1.1352

1.1721
0.0193

3.7817
6.0014

1.6169

2.0303

0.4880
0.0616
0.0002

0.0053

0.9037

0.0434

7.5831

0.0036
0.8004
0.4151
0.0261

3.6152
2.3219
6.0471
2.5550

6.9903
2.2755
1.4413
1.3269
0.1685

2.7744

3.5398

0.1318
4.6605
4.1965
1.5415

7.7752

2.6322

0.6458

0.4764

3.7999

Note: Subscript1 5 lagged one period. CR4 5 industry concentration; AD 5 advertising; PCM 5 pricecost margin; MES 5 minimum efﬁcient scale; KO 5 capital-output ratio; GR 5 output growth;
NL 5 dummy for a local or regional industry.
Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.

with the notion that all increases to the average concentration ratio cannot be
explained by the structural variables introduced in our model.3
For the advertising (Equation 3), we found that the industry conduct (advertising)
is affected positively and linearly by industry structure (concentration): The
coefﬁcient on CR42 is not statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, our ﬁndings support
the linear speciﬁcation used by Kambhampati (1996) and DKKV and we reject the
hypothesis of an inverted U shape effect suggested by Greer (1971), Cable (1972),
and Strickland and Weiss (1976). Advertising is also found to be explained by past
price-cost margins. This ﬁnding serves to suggest that advertising, ﬁnanced or
motivated by proﬁts, may be used to create future barriers to entry. Interestingly, the
industry growth does not affect advertising. The result seems to suggest a life-cycle
effect on advertising, that is, ﬂuctuations in sales do not change the advertising
decisions. Instead, the advertising expenditure appears to be planned according to
market shares and past proﬁts.
The trend variable was negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Inclusion of the trend
variable does not carry a speciﬁc hypothesis test. The negative and signiﬁcant sign is
best interpreted as the model capturing a factor outside our theoretical setup. To
speculate, at least two possible reasons exist that might explain this outcome. First,
ﬁrms eager to increase their in-store brand strength may have opted for greater
promotion efforts through displays and/or paying for premier shelf location.
Because our data do not contain these sorts of advertising costs, a negative trend
variable could be explaining why ﬁrms have simply shifted away from typical media
advertising to a portfolio of promotional strategies. Second, with the strong
theoretical links fully exposed between both concentration and lagged proﬁts on
advertising intensity, our negative trend variable may, in part, be picking up some of
the mitigating effects that sustained proﬁtability and market position may have in
making the advertising decision. Simply put, ﬁrms in a strong position with erected
entry barriers may back off their pursuit of even greater power.
Turning next to the estimation of price-cost margins (Equation 4), industry
concentration is shown to have a positive impact on price-cost margins; i.e.,
industries with higher concentration ratios tend to be more proﬁtable. This is a key
result supporting the TS view that mergers leading to higher concentration should be
taken seriously. Surprisingly, current period advertising was found to be insigniﬁcant
in explaining current proﬁtability, suggesting that ﬁrms see advertising in a longerrun capacity. This result is similar to Imel and Heimberger (1971), Nagle (1981), and
DKKV, where no speciﬁc relationship can be inferred between advertising and pricecost margins.

3
We also evaluated a regression model for the entire dataset that replaced the time trend variable with
ﬁxed effects for each of the census years. The signs on the regression parameters did not change and only
small changes in the magnitudes of the parameter estimates were noted. However, the MES variable in the
CR4 equation and the CR4 variable in the AD equation were no longer signiﬁcant. Although no strong
theoretical justiﬁcation can support either approach, we believe that the use of a time trend variable
represents a superior approach. The intent of the time trend variable was to capture trends such as
technology, demand for healthier foods, etc., that are hard to quantify. It appears to that collinearity
between these dummy variables and the MES term in the CR4 equation and/or CR4 variable in the AD
equation causes a loss of power in explaining key relationships in the model. Thus, we opted not to pursue
the ﬁxed effects model as a base model or in specifying the models with low and high advertising.

Two variables, capital expenditure (KO) and minimum efﬁcient scale (MES)
inversely affected the price-cost margin, which is similar to the ﬁndings in DKKV,
but not with others in the literature (see for example, Strickland & Weiss, 1976).
Nevertheless, this result is consistent with the idea that time and monetary
investments to adjust the ﬁrm size and its balance sheet may damage proﬁtability at
the margin. It is worth pointing out that full marginal impacts of MES include the
feedback effects that MES has on concentration. Thus, dPCM ¼ @PCM
þ @PCM

@CR4

dMES

@MES

¼ 0:0434 þ 0:0193  1:3269  0:0178. The result remains statistically

@CR4 @MES

signiﬁcant, but is only about 40% of the magnitude that the stand-alone MES
parameter has on PCM.
The coefﬁcient on the local/regional dummy variable (NL) was positive and
signiﬁcant. This implies those industries deﬁned to sell in the local or regional market
are more proﬁtable than industries operating on a national or international scale.
This is a key result because it insists that national concentration ratios are
insufﬁcient to describe how all markets are structured.
4.2. Partitioned Results
Table 4a and b contain the two-stage least squares results after partitioning the data
in the manner discussed earlier and presented in Table 2. For the high advertising
system of equations, unsurprising results emerge. Higher margins and lagged MES
both led to higher levels of concentration. Thus, CS notions about performance (i.e.,
PCM) feedback effects on structure are supported. Lagged advertising was
insigniﬁcant in explaining concentration, so we could not conﬁrm if the feedback
effects from conduct changed the industry structure. Increased concentration
statistically explained higher levels of advertising within the high advertising group
of industries, which implies that ﬁrms try to enhance entry barriers to preserve
market power. Supporting the TS theory, the coefﬁcient on concentration led to
higher price-cost margins. In addition, parameters on minimum efﬁcient scale and
capital outlays were negative and signiﬁcant. It appears that high advertising food
industries were quick to respond to ﬁrm size and capitalization issues even though
the marginal effects were negative. Finally, strong statistical support was found for
the local/regional dummy variable indicating ﬁrms selling highly advertised goods in
nonnational markets beneﬁted from higher margins. Overall, these results are not
much different from the results obtained by Kambhampati (1996) where both CS
and TS effects were noted throughout the system. The results were also not very
different from the results in Table 3 cover the entire range of industries.
The results for the low advertising industries were strikingly different. First, we
found that lower price-cost margins led to higher concentration, a result that
strongly supports a standard CS argument: The most proﬁtable ﬁrms are likely to
increase their market presence in industries where tight margins force inefﬁcient
ﬁrms to exit. The coefﬁcients on the ﬁrm size (MES and lagged MES) and lagged
capital outlays were all positive and signiﬁcant. These results suggest a strong effect
from increasing ﬁrm size and capitalization leading to greater concentration.
Only the coefﬁcient on lagged proﬁtability was signiﬁcant in explaining
advertising. In low advertising industries, concentration is highly insigniﬁcant and
does not explain changes in advertising. Turning now to the performance equation,
interesting and striking results emerged. Increased concentration led to lower

TABLE 4.
CR4
Dependent
Variable

Estimate

(a) Two-stage Least Squares
Constant
13.0340
CR4
CR42
AD1
0.8159
AD
PCM1
PCM
48.9709
MES1
2.3088
MES
0.0386
KO1
0.1767
KO
GR
NL
Year
1.1699

AD
t-value

Estimate

PCM
t-value

Estimate

Estimates for High Advertising Group
1.4155
13.7604
0.9769
0.6293
0.1073
2.3675
0.0169
0.0002
0.7169
1.4664
0.0082
1.7877
0.4039
1.7572
4.2464
0.0695
0.0313
0.8776
0.0048
14.3478
1.1235
0.4065
0.3404
1.5178
0.5191
2.3636
0.0115

(b) Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates for Low Advertising Group
Constant
35.8070
4.5578
0.8055
0.9101
0.4842
CR4
0.0037
0.8995
0.0082
CR42
0.0000
0.6854
AD1
6.7087
0.6362
AD
0.1001
PCM1
1.1196
2.0887
PCM
62.8087
1.7747
MES1
1.9798
2.5470
MES
1.6209
2.6913
0.0202
KO1
0.1684
1.6706
KO
0.0034
GR
0.8273
1.0511
0.7933
NL
0.1079
Year
2.9772
2.6483
0.0340
0.9633
0.0328

t-value
3.1463
10.5671
2.0325

8.4350
6.6506
2.3024
8.2328
3.6985
6.4864
6.3504
3.2718

5.3726
12.3877
8.4636
3.6455
6.8125

Note: Subscript1 5 lagged one period. CR4 5 industry concentration; AD 5 advertising; PCM 5 pricecost margin; MES 5 minimum efﬁcient scale; KO 5 capital-output ratio; GR 5 output growth;
NL 5 dummy for a local or regional industry.
Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.

industrial proﬁts, not higher as suggested by TS theory. The results strongly suggest
this group of industries is under signiﬁcant competitive pressure, leading to
consolidation and ﬁrm exit. Thus, despite the increased consolidation, ﬁrms were
not able to use the improved structure to their beneﬁt. Low advertising industries
face the challenge of selling potentially close substitutes that do not beneﬁt much
from a brand identity. It appears that concentration levels are not sufﬁciently high
enough to warrant concern about market power on prices during the years of this
study.

TABLE 5.
CR4

AD

PCM

(a) Elasticities in Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates for High Advertising Group
CR4
2.1652
2.1493
AD1
0.0499
AD
0.0632
PCM1
0.2209
PCM
0.3759
MES1
0.1900
MES
0.0031
0.3216
KO1
0.0924
KO
0.3161
GR
4.6287
1.3081
(b) Elasticities in Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates for Low Advertising Group
CR4
0.3940
1.5417
AD1
0.0299
AD
0.0794

PCM1
1.3572
PCM
0.3275
MES1
0.1512
MES
0.1080
0.0993

KO1
0.1427
KO
0.5288
GR
4.7449
3.9856
Note: eAD,CR4 5 (b312b4CR4t)CR4t/ADt. Its standard error is 0.4352 for (a) or 0.6179 for (b). ePCM,MES
includes an indirect effect through CR4. Its standard error is 0.0383 for (a) or 0.0340 for (b). ePCM,GR
includes an indirect effect through AD. Its standard error is 0.4110 for (a) or 0.3681 for (b).
Subscript1 5 lagged one period. CR4 5 industry concentration; AD 5 advertising; PCM 5 price-cost
margin; MES 5 minimum efﬁcient scale; KO 5 capital-output ratio; GR 5 output growth.
Denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.
Denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.

Table 5a and b contain elasticity information from the high and low advertising
industries, respectively. It is interesting to compare the magnitude of change between
each structure, conduct, and performance variable. For the high advertising
industries a major ﬁnding is that the impact of increasing concentration on proﬁt
is over 5 times larger in magnitude than the impact of proﬁt on concentration
(2.1493/0.3759 5 5.72; t-ratio 5 1.73). This ﬁnding is supported statistically and casts
serious doubt on the belief that market structure is a benign feature in an efﬁcient
and competitive market process. Clearly, increased concentration has a signiﬁcant
economic effect on performance and this result supports the long-held traditional
school of thought. Additionally, the elasticity of concentration on advertising was
statistically signiﬁcant, but the reverse relationship (i.e., lagged advertising on
concentration) is not signiﬁcant. This result suggests strongly that market structure

(i.e., concentration) is a much more powerful driver in shaping industries than does
market conduct.
For the low advertising industry elasticities (Table 5b), a similar dominance
emerges in that structure has much larger impacts on conduct and performance than
the reverse effects. However, neither concentration’s effect on advertising nor lagged
advertising’s effect on concentration were statistically supported. This is not
surprising given the lesser role of advertising in these industries. Additionally,
concentration’s effect on performance is not positively related. Thus, the most
obvious conclusion is one consistent with CS underpinnings. In industries with
tightening margins, performance informs market participants to restructure as
perhaps an act of survival. For the years of this study, low advertising ﬁrms were
simply unable to translate improved market structure into better margins.
The results from each of the three regressions informed us to consider a quadratic
PCM term in the CR4 equation and to use the whole dataset. This allowed us to test
the hypothesis that both very high and very low performance sends the strongest
signal to restructure the industry toward higher concentration. We ran this
regression and report only the relevant information on the quadratic terms with
standard errors reported below each coefﬁcient:4
2

CR4 ¼ :::  146:86PCM þ 241:45PCM :::
ð46:67Þ
ð70:78Þ

ð5Þ

Here, we ﬁnd statistical support that both the most negative and positive PCMs sent
the strongest signals for industry restructuring. Coincidentally, the minimum point
of the U-shaped relationship (0.304) occurs close to the mean of PCM data (0.331),
which certainly explains the opposing signs on the PCM coefﬁcients from the
partitioned regression. This result is suggestive that functional relationships
spanning the cross section matter a great deal and that working with more
homogeneous groups of industries is advisable.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study, we explore the intertemporal and feedback interrelations among
dependent variables of structure, conduct, and performance for 48 four-digit SIC
food and tobacco processing industries during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Using an
intertemporal simultaneous-equation framework provided a unique backdrop for
comparisons between Chicago School and Traditionalist School views about
industrial organization and antitrust enforcement. The model was estimated with
entire dataset and with the data partitioned between high and low advertising
industries. The models were coded in GAUSS and estimated using two-stage least
squares with the structure (concentration) conduct (advertising) and performance
(price-cost margins) assumed endogenous. All of the exogenous variables served as
instruments in the ﬁrst-stage estimations.
We can summarize our ﬁnding around ﬁve major points. First, clearly and
convincingly, the CS point that performance informs the industry about how to
4

The regression results for the advertising and PCM equations are identical to the results in Table 3. The
unreported coefﬁcients in the CR4 equation are quite robust and maintain the same statistical signiﬁcance
found in the ﬁrst column of Table 3.

structure was supported in both partitioned data estimations and in an auxiliary
regression allowing for U-shaped performance effects on concentration. In the low
advertising set of industries, as performance worsened, concentration pushed higher.
This presumably suggests consolidation occurred to avoid economic losses. The
explanation is also supported in the performance equation where increasing
concentration was correlated with tighter PCMs. In high advertising industries,
higher PCMs led to higher and statistically signiﬁcant levels of concentration. The
partitioned regressions and the auxiliary regression show that performance impacts
on structure follow a U-shaped pattern: performance signals leading to restructuring
are strongest in the highest and lowest performing industries.
Second, support for the TS point that exogenous forces shape both the structure
and performance of the industry was evident in all the estimations. Minimum
efﬁcient scale, lagged minimum efﬁcient scale, and lagged capital outlay were
positive and mostly signiﬁcant factors that led to higher industry concentration.
Third, the TS reference to structural linkages to performance was strongly supported
in the all-industry regression, in the regression involving high advertising industries,
and in the comparative elasticity analysis. Most revealing was the elasticity analysis,
which showed that structure affects advertising levels and industry performance much
more than the reverse effects. In particular, structural impacts on performance were
over 5 times higher in magnitude than performance impacts had on structure.
Fourth, support was found in the full sample and in high advertising partition for
the theory that local and regional ﬁrms enjoy higher levels of performance compared
to national ﬁrms. Clearly, antitrust authorities should continue to pay close attention
to relevant markets when evaluating acquisitions.
Fifth, and ﬁnally, in this article we took no parochial stand in placing favor with
either the Chicago or the Traditionalist School of thought. Our results ﬁnd elements
of support in both viewpoints. In particular, the strong statistical support for
performance informing structure was balanced with support for structure leading to
increased performance. However, from an economic impact point of view, the
magnitude of these effects is far more supportive of the traditionalist view when
confronting the high advertising group of industries.
To conclude, cross-sectional industrial organization research such as this study
provides useful policy-relevant results and paints a broad picture of the economic
landscape. Our results point clearly to recommendations about mergers. Horizontal
mergers should be carefully scrutinized and challenged when performance levels are
high and/or products are branded through heavy advertising. Industries in decline or
selling products in which ﬁrm prices are not protected by brands or other forms of
differentiation may need a green light to restructure quickly. A more updated
assessment of the U.S. food industry should include data from the more recent
Census of Manufactures. However, changes in industry classiﬁcation systems and
availability of advertising data limited our scope to 1992 as the ﬁnal year. The U.S.
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) system was changed in 1997 to the North
American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS). The problem of matching data
between these two classiﬁcation systems is not difﬁcult; however, it is not yet clear
that the new classiﬁcation system is a superior way to deﬁne the relevant industry
boundaries. Additionally, organizing advertising data by industry remains an
arduous and expensive task. Despite the hurdles, our research is suggestive that

updated studies of this nature do a good job of informing policy makers and
antitrust authorities about overall competitive condition in the U.S. food sector.
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